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Supreme Court Review
person may not be able to consent to negligence in the abstract.35
As stated, when the subsection was promulgated, fault liability consti-
tuted the foundation of the law of torts and insurance coverage was
less wide spread. But these factors are no longer operative. As a
matter of policy, fault liability should be of no account.
36
First, it is the writer's thesis that the aim of the law in penalizing fault
should be clearly and finally separated from the aim of compensating
victims. Fault should be relegated entirely to the criminal law, where
it properly belongs, and the community as a whole should ensure that
victims of accidents are compensated whether or not a particular indi-
vidual can be proved at fault. So long as the ideas of fault and of
compensation are linked in our civil law of torts, we shall fail to
achieve either aim of the law. Historically, fault first developed as a
concept in the criminal law, and it was only later that it was taken
over into the civil law as a tortious concept governing compensation to
the victim of a wrong.37
As a matter of practice, fault has become a meaningless concept when
the smallest error in judgment can result in a law suit of astronomic
proportions.38 Secondly, third party liability insurance is now of
almost universal incidence. 39 The last step remaining is to make such
coverage compulsory.40 There can be no doubt that this is a social
necessity.4 ' Thus, the occasion of loss-spreading has become virtually
so complete than any legislative anomalies should be eradicated. The
courts in general have shown their abhorrence of the "gratuitous
passenger" clause and the public is definitely uneasy about its opera-
tion. Undoubtedly, the legislature would be well advised both on legal
and political grounds to abolish subsection 105(2). A.R.A.S.
Burke v. Perry and Perry, [1963] S.C.R. 329.
This case in which the Supreme Court of Canada reverses the
Manitoba Court of Appeal and restores the judgment of the trial
judge is an illustration of Jerome Frank's thesis that the essential
jurisprudence is to be found in the trial courts and not in the higher
35 See Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 N.B. 509. The mere fact that a motorist
is receiving a gratuitous benefit from the driver does not mean that he thereby
consents to run the risk of suffering injury caused by the driver's negligence
and to forego compensation.
36 See Friedmann, Social Insurance and Principles of Tort Liability (1949)
Harv. L. Rev. 241.
37 Harris, D. R., Oompensation for Accidents, (1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960)
Solicitors' Journal, p. 1.
38 Note here the so called "thin skull" cases.
39 The figures here are conflicting, but it can be assumed that there is
now 97-99% coverage.
40 In Saskatchewan, a scheme not based on fault has been in force since
1946; it is administered on a non-profit basis, by a Crown corporation, the
Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office.41See Accident Facts, 1962: Statistics Relating to Motor Vehicle Traffic
Accidents, Ontario Department of Transport. In 1962, 1,383 persons were killed
in Ontario. If 2% of all motorists were uninsured this would mean that 27
persons were possibly left without any remedy whatsoever.
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courts. The court was asked to determine whether the conduct of
the respondent Irene Perry in driving a motor vehicle amounted to
"gross" as opposed to "ordinary" negligence. On this distinction
depended the claim of the appellant here to take advantage of s. 99 (1)
of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 112, which provides
gratuitous passengers may recover from the host driver where the
driver's conduct is proved to be grossly negligent. The trial judge
had found that the cumulative effect of several negligent acts on the
part of the respondent did constitute gross negligence. In effect, the
majority of the Court of Appeal tried to evaluate the proper weight
to give to the evidence in applying to it the law. They (the majority)
felt there should be a flagrant quality in some of the acts which
cumulatively constituted gross negligence. Speaking for the Court,
Ritchie J. agrees with Freedman J.A. in his dissenting opinion that
"An appellate court should be slow to substitute its opinion for his
[t.j.] as to whether the defendant's conduct amounts to gross negli-
gence." Ritchie J. considers this is not a case "on which the opinion
of an appellate court as to the quality of the negligence should be
substituted for the opinion reached by the learned trial judge."
In effect the case is a reminder from the highest authority that
appellate courts must deal with questions of law, and rely for better
or for worse on the first hand impressions of the trial judge as to
what the facts are. As the Court pointed out:
: * .the difficult task of assessing the quality of the negligent action ...
in order to determine whether or not they [the facts] are to be charac-
terized as "gross negligence" involves a reconstruction of the circum-
stances of the accident itself including the reactions of persons involved,
and this is a function for which the trial judge who has seen and heard
the witnesses is far better equipped than are the judges of an appellate
court.
Burkhardt v. Beder, [1963] S.C.R. 86.
In the case of Burkhardt v. Bederl the Court has settled a prob-
lem in procedure which had apparently puzzled the Ontario Bar for
some time.
In this case the widow of the late Christian Burkhardt sued for
damages under the Fatal Accidents Act.2 The statement of claim as
originally delivered claimed general damages of $15,000 and $300
for funeral expenses. By an amendment made at the opening of the
trial, the claim for general damages was increased to $20,000.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 86.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 138.
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